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Protection of Sound Recordings Under the
Proposed Copyright Revision Bill
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the phonograph record has achieved a promi-
nent role in exposing the American public to music and in fash-
ioning its musical tastes.1 It has been estimated that ninety-five
percent of all new music is first brought to public attention
through phonograph records.2 An estimated sixty million Amer-
icans are exposed daily to wired-music services.3 Many radio
stations devote up to eighty percent of their broadcast time to
phcnograph records.4 The phonograph record has also revolu-
tionized the music industry and profession. It is presently, di-
rectly or indirectly, the most substantial source of income to
composers and music publishers.5
The recording industry is fiercely competitive.6 Although
retail sales of records have increased, record producers complain
of decreasing profit margins.7 Smaller companies face great dif-
ficulties in entering the market.8 Success often depends upon
the ability to anticipate the wild fluctuations in the tastes of
the consumers,9 who are primarily teenagers and preteenagers. 10
Record counterfeiters and "pirates"'" make this risky busi-
1. See generally Gould, The Prospects of Recording, High Fidel-
ity, April 1966, p. 46.
2. Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 2, at 944
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
3. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. See also Green,
Music To Hear but Not To Listen to, Saturday Rev., Sept. 28, 1957, p. 55.
4. CoRRy, THE PHONOGRAPH RECORD IxDusTRY: AN EcoNoM c STUDY
99 (Washington, The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service,
Feb. 9, 1965); [hereinafter cited as CoRRY]; 1965 Hearings 1394.
5. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS,
SENATE COlMVi. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE CoMPULsoRY
LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHt LAW 44 (Comm. Print 1960)
(Study No. 5, by Prof. Henn) [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 5]; id.,
THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF S COmP U:SoRY LICENSE 105 (Comm. Print
1960) (Study No. 6, by W. Blaisdell) [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 6].
6. 1965 Hearings 810-11; CoRRY 251; Hamill, The Record Business-
"It's Murder," Fortune, May 1961, p. 148.
7. See 1965 Hearings 947; Hamill, supra note 6.
8. In 1957 it was estimated that forty companies controlled 99% of
music production. Hentoff, The Major Minors, Saturday Rev., Sept. 28,
1957, p. 67. See CoRY 40-81.
9. 1965 Hearings 948-49; Newsweek, Oct. 11, 1965, pp. 85-88.
10. 1965 Hearings 951; Schickel, The Big Revolution in Records,
Look, April 15, 1958, pp. 27-28; Newsweek, Oct. 11, 1965, p. 85.
11. Hearings on H.R. 6354 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 28, at 8 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
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ness even more hazardous. Record counterfeiters siphoned off
an estimated twenty million dollars from industry gross sales in
1960.12 The rights and economic interests of composers, music
publishers, recording artists, legitimate record manufacturers,
and, ultimately, the public are all affected by these activities.
Primarily in response to this problem, sound recordings 3 are




Although disagreement has been voiced,' 5 it is generally ac-
cepted that the copyright clause of the Constitution 6 is broad
enough to permit copyright protection for sound recordings.'7
No copyright statute has limited its scope to "writings" in a
l2. Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
13. "Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixa-
tion of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work; regardless of the nature of the material ob-jects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they
are embodied.
Copyright Revision Bill § 101, H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
[hereinafter referred to in text and notes as Bill].
14. Extensive hearings were held during 1965 on the Bill; see 1965
Hearings. H.R. 4347, as revised, was reported out of committee and
recommended for passage on Oct. 13, 1966. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. H.R. 2512,
the 1967 version of the bill, was reported on favorably by the House
Committee on the Judiciary on March 2, 1967. Wall Street Journal,
March 3, 1967, p. 11, col. 2. Senate hearings were scheduled to begin
March 15. Id., p. 1, col. 3.
15. The principal objections raised, chiefly by authors and record
users, are that performers are not "authors" and records are not "writ-
ings." It is argued that the contribution of the manufacturer, in par-
ticular, is not creative enough to be copyrighted. See, e.g., Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (both
majority and dissent); 1965 Hearings 1721.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
17. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657, 660 (2d Cir. 1955); STAFF OF SuBCoMVE. No. 3, HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., PRELnIINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAwV AND DIscussIoNs AND CoMMENTs ON THE DRAFT, Copy-
RIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 3, 75 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited
as PART 3]; 1965 Hearings 1863 (statement of Hon. Abraham L. Kamin-
stein, Register of Copyrights); Bodenhausen, Protection of "Neighboring
Rights", 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 156, 159 (1954); Chafee, Reflections
on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 734-35 (1945); Dia-
mond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 8 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 337 (1961).
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literal sense.18 Since the protection of the present Copyright Act
is extended to "all the writings of an author," it may seem that
all matter constitutionally capable of being copyrighted, includ-
ing records and recorded performances, already has adequate pro-
tection. However, the statutory list of classes of works for reg-
istration, 9 which has come to define the scope of copyrightability
under the act, does not include phonorecords. Although there is
some dispute,20 it seems generally agreed that records are not
covered by the present copyright statute,21 and that neither the
artist whose performance is fixed in the phonograph record nor
the record manufacturer who fixes it has any protection under
the act.22
No state statute recognizes rights in sound recordings or
recorded performances.2 3 In fact, three states have enacted stat-
utes which purport to deny all common law protection to any
record placed on sale.24  While the purpose of these laws is to
prevent the collection of royalties from commercial users of rec-
ords, they may foreclose any common law right to prevent dub-
bing in those states.25
Los Angeles has the only municipal prohibition against un-
authorized dubbing.26 This ordinance has been invoked in recent
18. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., THE MEANING OF
"WRITINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 71 (Comm.
Print -1960) (Study No. 3, by Prof. Walter J. Derenberg) [hereinafter
cited as STUDY No. 3].
19. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1952).
20. See, e.g., PART 3, 195.
....21. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657
(2d Cir. 1955); Regulations of the Copyright Office, 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b)
(1960). See generally NIMMER, COPYRIGHr § 35 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as NIMMER]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
'RIGHTS, 'SENATE COMM, ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE UN-
-AUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND RECORDINGS 2-7 (Comm. Print 1961)(Study No.'26, 'by Barbara Ringer) [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 26];
:Chafee, supra note 17, at 733-37.
22. The rights of the recording'artist and the record manufacturer
must be distinguished from those of the owner of copyright covering the
musical composition recorded. The owner possesses the exclusive right
'to Yecoid the composition and to perform it publicly for profit. 17 U.S.C.
§1l(e) (1952). '
23. STUDY No. 26, 8-9.
24.. 'FLA. STAT. AN. §§ 543.02, .03 (<1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28
('1965); S.C. CODE AN. § 66-101 "(1962); STUDY No. 26, 9. The statutes
were passed after the decisions in Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338
(E.D:N.C. -1939), and Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327
Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937)' which seemed to give a performer a per-
petual- copyright in his recorded performance.
""25. STUDY No. 26, 9.
26. Los ANGELES, CALIF., MUNI cIPAL CODE' § 42.19.1 (1955).
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cases, but the counterfeiters are often released with only minor
fines.27 Further, even if effectively enforced, a restriction in
only one locality is not likely to have a significant effect upon
the activities of record counterfeiters.
In 1962 Congress enacted legislation making it a federal of-
fense to knowingly transport, receive, sell, or offer for sale in
interstate or foreign commerce any phonograph record bearing
a forged or counterfeit label.28 This legislation has not pro-
vided a satisfactory solution.29 The act can probably be avoided
if the record pirate merely puts a new label on his records.
The fact that no prosecution has been brought under the stat-
ute is an indication of the difficult problems of proof involved. 30
B. CommoN LAW
Protection against duplication of phonograph records may
be available under one or more common law theories: right to
privacy,31 interference with contractual relations,3 2 moral right,33
and quantum meruit.3 4 However, theories other than common
law copyright and unfair competition are rarely used and thus
have been put outside the scope of this discussion.
1. Common Law Copyright
To be eligible for common law copyright protection, neither
novelty or addition to the prior state of the art nor artistic
quality is required.35 A work need be only an independently
27. See 1962 Hearings 46-50.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1962). For other suggested remedies, see
Wilmarth, Statutory Remedies for Record Piracy, 12 ASCAP COPY IGHT
LAw SymP. 261 (1963).
29. It has, however, apparently discouraged large chain stores from
marketing counterfeit records. See 1962 Hearings 32-33.
30. See 1962 Hearings 46-50.
31. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 456,
194 Atl. 631, 642 (1937) (concurring opinion). See generally Nimmer,
The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 203 (1954); Phillips,
Related Rights and American Copyright Law: Compatible or Incom-
patible, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYmp. 219, 253-55 (1959).
32. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 802-03, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 498-99 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd,
279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). Contra, Cable Vision, Inc.
v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
33. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1952) (concurring
opinion).
34. Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., 18 U.S.L. W= 2044 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1949) (dictum).
35. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v. Don-
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produced 6 intellectual creation.37  Although common law copy-
right has been held to exist in recordings, 3 this protection is
probably limited to the performer's contribution to the sound
recording.39 Arguments based upon the creativity of the contri-
bution of the manufacturer to the recording 40 have generally
been rejected by the courts.4 1
Common law copyright is perpetual in duration 42 and is lost
only by publication.43 Public sale of phonograph records may
be a publication of an uncopyrighted composition,44 but prob-
aldson Lithographing Co., 138 U.S. 239, 252 (1903); Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926. One case, Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937), implied that a recorded performance
had to be of more than ordinary aesthetic value to qualify for a com-
mon law copyright. This implication has been widely criticized. See,
e.g., Bass, Interpretative Rights of Performing Artists, 42 DIcK. L. REv.
57 (1938); Traicoff, Rights of the Performing Artist in His Interpreta-
tion and Performance, 11 Ama L. REv. 225 (1940).
36. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1903); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103
(2d Cir. 1951).
37. NIMMER § 10. See generally STAFF OF SuBcomm. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WoRKs 3-5 (Comm. Print
1961) (Study No. 29, by William S. Strauss) [hereinafter cited as STUDY
No. 29]; Note, CATV: Liability for the Uncompensated Transmission of
Television Programs, 50 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356-59 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as CATV].
38. E.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 109 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), aff'd, 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
39. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940); STUDY No. 26, 12 n.108, and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph
Record Industry, 8 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 337, 348 (1961); Note, 49 YALE
L.J. 559, 561 (1940). But see Traicoff, Rights of the Performing Artist
in his Interpretation and Performance, 11 Am L. REV. 225, 257 (1940).
41. The court in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939), did not consider the manufacturer's contribution creative.
Id. at 792. On appeal, Judge Hand reasoned from the "doubtful" as-
sumption that the manufacturer's skill might be protected by common
law copyright. 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Capitol Re-
cords, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955) (as-
sumption that manufacturer acquired all rights from performers).
42. Ketcham v. New York World's 'Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657
(E.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1941); NIMmER § 112.1.
43. Warner Bros. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 102 F. Supp.
141 (S.D. Cal. 1951); NnvMER § 112.1. Publication occurs when visually
perceptible copies of the work are made available to the public. STUDY
No. 26, 14; STUDY No. 29, 8.
44. McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (dictum); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F.
[Vol. 51: 746
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ably does not constitute publication of the recorded performance
itself.4r Recorded performances are seemingly protected by a
perpetual common law copyright which is not lost by sale of the
phonograph record.
2. Unfair Competition
The traditional cause of action for unfair competition re-
quired proof of three essential elements: competition between
plaintiff and defendant; appropriation by defendant of a business
asset acquired by plaintiff through the exercise of skill, money,
time and effort; and public confusion resulting from the palming
off of the defendant's product as the plaintiff's. 46 In the ordi-
nary dubbing situation it is very difficult to establish these ele-
ments. While the counterfeiter usually competes with the rec-
ord manufacturer, the performer probably cannot show direct
competition. Further, because the pirate rarely misrepresents
the source of the recording,47 palming off is extremely difficult
to show.
In response to these difficulties, the general trend toward
expansion of the scope of unfair competition has been particu-
larly marked in the area of sound recordings. 48 In International
News Serv. v. Associated Press,49 the Supreme Court discarded
the palming off requirement,"0 and established a test based upon
Supp. 473, (N.D. IlM. 1950) (dictum); Kaplan, Publication in Copyright
Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469
(1955); Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLum. L. REV. 185 (1956).
45. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d
481 (2d Cir. 1956); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). Earlier cases had indicated that sale and dis-
tribution of phonorecords was a publication divestitive of common law
copyright. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,
Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937) (dictum).
46. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
258-59 (1918).
47. STUnY No. 26, 17.
48. See, e.g., Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034,
155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937). But see
Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632
(1960); Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904
(S.D. Cal. 1950). See generally Oberst, Use of the Doctrine of Unfair
Competition to Supplement Copyright in the Protection of Literary and
Musical Property, 29 Ky. L.J. 271 (1941); Note, Piracy on Records, 5
STAN. L. REV. 433 (1953).
49. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
50. Id. at 241-42.
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unjust enrichment.51 Although read very narrowly in most
areas,52 the misappropriation doctrine of INS has been widely
applied in the entertainment field.53 In Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,54 the court stated that
neither palming off3 5 nor direct competition56 was essential to
state a cause of action in unfair competition. However, since
both elements were present on the facts of the case, its authority
on the point is weak.57 Relying on Metropolitan Opera, the court
in Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc.,58 found unfair competition
in a dubbing situation in which there was neither direct com-
petition nor palming off.
3. Recent Developments
The availability of common law protection for phonograph
records and recorded performances has been cast in doubt by two
recent Supreme Court decisions. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.59 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,00 the
Court held that the paramount federal interest in national uni-
formity of patent protection precluded the states, under any
common law theory, from recognizing any right which conflicts
with the policies and objectives of the federal patent laws. Al-
though the common law copyright in "unpublished writings" was
not intended to be affected,61 the Court held that "a State may
not, when an article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit
51. Id. at 239.
52. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.
1940); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1929);
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,
46 F. Supp. 198 (1940).
53. See, e.g., Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (10th
Cir. 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Pitts-
burgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa.
1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), alf'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
54. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
55. Id. at 793, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
56. Id. at 795, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92.
57. STumY No. 26, 19.
58. 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
59. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
60. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
61. 376 U.S. at 231 n.7. Note that § 2 of the act refers to unpub-
lished works, not writings. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Docu-
mentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811
(Sup. Ct. 1964), found a common law copyright in a nonwriting. See
CATV at 358 n.54.
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the copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying.6 12
Neither the courts63 nor the commentators6 4 are agreed upon
the effect of the Sears and Compco decisions. They could be
read to adopt the view, set forth by Judge Learned Hand in his
dissent in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.,6 5 that
all rights pertaining to any work capable of protection under
the federal constitution must be defined as a matter of federal
law.6 1 In RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,61 Judge Hand held the
sale of phonograph records to be a divestitive publication ter-
minating any common law copyright in the recorded perform-
ance. The contrary conclusion of the majority in Capitol Rec-
ords, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., rendered before Sears and
Compco, resulted from the application of state law declared in
Metropolitan Opera.63 Thus federal courts may conclude that
Sears and Compco have reinstated the Whiteman holding.69
Since a finding that dubbing constitutes unfair competition
would accord a right equivalent to copyright protection, the law
of unfair competition may also be removed as a means of pro-
tecting the record producer and recording artist. Thus, although
the point is not yet settled, Sears and Compco appear to have
deprived any recording made available to the public of all com-
mon law protection. At the very least, the uncertainty stemming
from the decisions has made common law protection against dub-
bing less effective.
62. 376 U.S. at 232-33. Mr. Justice Black relied on G. Ricordi &
Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952), for this statement.
63. See, e.g., Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d
716 (4th Cir. 1964); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964); Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th
Cir. 1964); New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 21 App.
Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964); Columbia Broadcasting Sys, Inc.
v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809
(Sup. Ct. 1964). See generally CATV at 353-54.
64. See, e.g., NnImER § 59 at 231.1; STAFF or Suncom-. No. 3,
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JuDicIARy, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL "REVISION or THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BIL, CoPYRIGHr LAW REVISION,
PART 6, 50 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as PART 6]; Bender,
Brown, Derenberg, Handler & Leeds, Product Simulation: A Right or
a Wrong? 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1178 (1964); Spiegel, Variety: Beatles
Beware! 39 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 245 (1964).
65. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
66. NIMuER § 59 at 231.1.
67. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
68. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
69. NnviMER § 59 at 231.1.
1967]
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III. PAST LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Between 1906 and 1951, thirty-one bills which would have
provided some protection for sound recordings were introduced
in Congress.70 Twenty-nine were additions to the copyright law;
two were proposed as amendments to the Communications Act.71
Though many of these bills aroused considerable interest,7 2
none were passed. Their defeat is attTibutable to the conflicting
economic interests of two opposing groups: the first consisting of
the authors and users, and the second of the performers and
manufacturers.7 3 The alignment of the two groups and their
arguments-dictated chiefly by economic self-interest-remain
virtually unchanged. However, there has not been, in the course
of controversy over these many proposals, any substantial oppo-
sition to limited protection against dubbing.74
IV. THE COPYRIGHT REVISION BILL
A. SOUND RECORDINGS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT
The Bill defines the subject matter of copyright as "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion.175 Seven categories are set forth as examples of original
works of authorship, the last of which is sound recordings.76
70. See generally STUDY No. 26, 21-37.
71. H.R. 5791, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. 6695, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939). See STUDy No. 26, 21-37.
72. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Or LITERARY AND
ARTIsTIc PROPERTY 870-73 (1938); Diamond & Adler, Proposed Copyright
Revision and Phonograph Records, 11 AIR L. REV. 29 (1940); Traicoff,
Rights of the Performing Artist in His Interpretation and Performance,
11 An L. REv. 225 (1940); Note, Revision of the Copyright Law, 51 HAZv.
L. REv. 906, 915-16 (1938).
73. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), omitted any provision for
copyright in sound recordings, in part because "no way could be found
at the present time for reconciling the serious conflicts of interest in
this field." Letter-memorandum from the executive secretary of the
Shotwell Committee, reprinted in 86 CONG. REc. 77, 78 (1940), and quoted
in STUDY No. 26, 34.
74. STUDy No. 26, 37.
75. Bill § 102. The phrase "works of authorship" was chosen in
preference to "writings" to make it clear that the Bill is not intended
to exhaust the constitutional power of Congress and to avoid the pos-
sibility that "writings" be given different meanings in the constitu-
tional and statutory contexts. HousE REPORT 42-43; PART 6, 3. Use of
the word "original" suggests that the standard developed under the pres-
ent act, requiring originality but not aesthetic or intellectual value,
novelty, or ingenuity, will apply under the Bill. Ibid. See generally
HousE REPORT 93-95; PART 6, 5, 49-53; Diamond, Phonorecords and Sound
Recordings, 13 BuLL. CoPYRIGm Soc'y 20 (1965).
76. Bill § 102.
[Vol. 51:746
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"Sound recordings" are works consisting of a collocation of
sounds, from any source, fixed in a tangible medium from which
they may be reproduced.77 It is the captured performance, pre-
served in a tangible object, which is protected.7 8 Thus, an audi-
ble but unrecorded performance is not copyrightable because it
lacks the physical embodiment and permanence necessary for
copyright protection.
The source of the sounds making up the sound recording
does not affect copyrightability. 79 For example, a recording of
natural sounds, such as bird calls, would be capable of protec-
tion.8 0 This is of great significance to the composer of electronic
music. Electronic music, consisting of natural and artificial
sounds manipulated electronically,8 ' has been denied protection
under the present act because it cannot be reduced to a visually
perceptible form.8
2
The sound recording must be distinguished from the tangible
object in which it is reproduced-the phonorecord. 83 Protection
is accorded to the collection of sounds stored on the phonorecord,
not to the material object itself. Thus, transfer of a par-
ticular phonorecord transfers none of the rights of the owner of
copyright, just as transfer of a copy of a book transfers none of
the author's rights. A phonorecord may be transferred without
the authorization of the copyright owner.
84
It is also important to distinguish between the sound record-
ing as an embodiment of literary, dramatic, or musical work,
and the sound recording as a work in itself. Thus, when a song
which has not previously been reduced to written notation is re-
corded, two works are protected. Since a work is copyrightable
if fixed in any tangible medium from which it can be repro-
duced, 5 the recording will secure copyright protection for the
77. See Bill § 101. Sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audio-visual work are, however, excepted from this definition.
78. HousE REPORT 46. Protection is being extended "to the prod-
uct of recording, not the act of recording." PART 3, 61 (statement by
Mr. Goldman of the Copyright Office).
79. Bill § 101: "'Sound recordings' are works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds .... " (Em-
phasis added.)
80. HOUSE REPORT 47; PART 3, 61-62, 355-56.
81. Salzman, Music From the Electronic Universe, High Fidelity,
Aug. 1964, p. 54.
82. HousE REPORT 46; PART 6, 5.
83. A phonorecord is any material object in which sounds are
fixed and from which the sounds can be reproduced. Bill § 101.
84. Bill § 109(a).
85. Bill § 102.
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song. But the sound recording itself is also a copyrightable work,
separate and distinct from the song. When a composition in the
public domain is recorded, the recording contains only one copy-
righted work: the sound recording. It is the sound recording
as a separate work which is the subject matter of this Note.
B. SCOPE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN SouND RECORDINGS
The Bill would grant the owner of copyright in a sound re-
cording only the right to reproduce and distribute phonorecords
embodying the actual sounds of the recording.86
Section 114 denies the owner of copyright in sound record-
ings the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.8 7 Thus
there is no right to prevent imitation or simulation of the
sounds of a recording, even if the imitation is virtually indistin-
guishable from the original sound recording.8 Such an imita-
tion would constitute a second, independent performance and
would be capable of copyright protection. Both recordings would
have equal status under the Bill. Section 114 is not, however,
intended to permit reproduction of a sound recording, with minor
deletions, additions or alterations, to escape liability as a deriva-
tive work.89 The intent is that any substantial reproduction of
the sounds contained in a copyrighted sound recording shall in-
fringe the copyright in the sound recording.0
Section 114 also withholds from the owner of copyright in a
sound recording the exclusive right to perform the work pub-
licly. Thus a radio station could broadcast a phonorecord with-
out obtaining permission from the owner of copyright in the
sound recording.91
The Bill purports to preempt all state created rights in the
nature of copyright protection as they pertain to any work within
the subject matter of copyright.92 Moreover, it is intended that
86. Bill §§ 106(1) (3), 114(a).
,87. A derivative work is one "based upon one or more preexisting
works . .. .' Bill § 101. Translations, musical arrangements and art
reproductions are derivative works. A sound recording is also a deriv-
.ative work since it is based on the musical composition or other work
performed. The exclusive right to prepare derivate works is recognized
in most other classes of works. See Bill § 106.
88. Bill § 114(b). See HousE REPORT 94-95; PART 6, 52.
89. HOUSE REPORT 94-95; PAiAT 6, 52.
90. Ibid.
91. However, such a broadcast would infringe upon the rights of
the owner of copyright in the musical composition performed on the
sound recording. Bill §§ 106(4), 114(c); HOUSE REPORT 95; PART 6,
52-53.
92. Bill § 301(a).
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any theory of misappropriation which would create rights equiv-
alent to copyright be precludedf 3 Thus, a state could not grant
a performance right in sound recordings, since such a right is
equivalent to copyright.
Preemption does not extend, however, to violations of rights
which are not in the nature of copyright protection.94 Since
state causes of action for palming off or false representation are
specified to be within this exception, a state could probably pun-
ish a record counterfeiter but not a record dubber.
C. INFBINGEMwT
Only unauthorized reproduction in the form of phonorecords
of the actual sounds contained in a copyrighted sound recording
would be an infringement under the Bill.95 Although a literal
reading of section 114(b) would indicate that any reproduction
is forbidden, the drafters intended that only substantial takings
would be an infringement. 96 It is not clear, however, what con-
stitutes a substantial taking. Suppose, for example, that four
bars of a copyrighted sound recording are re-recorded as back-
ground for a radio or television commercial. If the sole purpose
of according copyright protection to sound recordings is to pro-
vide effective protection against the activities of record counter-
feiters and dubbers, it could be argued that infringement should
be found only when such an amount has been taken that the
product of the alleged infringer could compete as a substitute for
the copyrighted sound recording. However, such an argument
runs against the usual notions of the nature of copyright protec-
tion. Copyright is not ordinarily intended merely as a protec-
tion against direct competition. The present and prior copyright
laws have given the copyright owner a right in the nature of a
property right which allows him to prevent any exploitation of
his work, even exploitations which he himself could not or would
not pursue. There is no indication that the right given under the
Bill to the owner of copyright in a sound recording to prevent
reproduction of his work should not be read as broadly. In the
case posed above, the maker of the commercial has taken a suf-
ficiently substantial portion of the protected sound recording so
that it may reasonably be presumed that he will profit economi-
cally from its use. Since the sound recording has been exploited
93. HOUSE REPORT 126-27, 129; PART 6, 85.
94. Bill § 301(b) (3).
95. Bill § 114(b).
96. PART 6, 52.
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
without authorization of the owner of copyright, this should be
an infringement. A taking should be allowed only when it is so
insubstantial as to constitute an insignificant part of the value
of the product of the taker.
The manner of reproduction is immaterial, 97 but infringement
would exist only if the product of the reproducer is a phono-
record. 98 The latter limitation produces an exemption probably
not intended by the draftsmen. Since the definition of phono-
records in section 101 specifically excludes motion picture sound
tracks, reproduction of a sound recording in such a manner would
not violate any right granted to the owner of copyright in the
sound recording. This exception appears contrary to the scheme
of protection for sound recordings, and should be corrected be-
fore final enactment of the Bill.
Problems may arise involving unauthorized recordings of
radio or television broadcasts of live performances. If no au-
thorized recording is made of the performance, it is accorded no
protection by the Bill since the performance has not been fixed
in a "tangible medium of expression."9 9 However, because the
performance is not within the subject matter of copyright, state
remedies protecting the broadcaster and performers" 0 would
not be preempted by the Bill.
If, however, both an authorized and an unauthorized record-
ing are simultaneously made of the broadcast performance, the
result is less clear. In such a case the alleged infringer has
captured the same sounds as are fixed in the authorized sound
recording,1°1 but he has not copied the authorized recording.
It could be argued that the alleged infringer has not in-
fringed but has independently created his own copyrightable
work by taping particular sounds that the Bill has preempted
from state protection. 0 2 Section 114(b) describes the sound re-
97. HouSE REPORT 94; PART 6, 52.
98. Bill § 114(b).
99. Bill § 102.
100. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
101. However, if the authorized recording is made in a studio, and
the unauthorized version is taken off the air, it may be argued that the
two recordings are not identical due to the distortion inherent in broad-
casting. Since the broadcast sound has no permanence or tangibility,
it is not covered by the Bill and hence state law is not preempted.
Under Wagner-Nichols, the broadcaster would have an action against
the unauthorized recorder under either unfair competition or common
law copyright.
102. PART 3, 356 (statement by Sidney A. Diamond).
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cording right as "the right to duplicate the sound recording in
the form of phonorecords that directly or indirectly recapture the
actual sounds fixed in the recording." This language can be
read to mean that infringement exists only when there is a tak-
ing of sound from the authorized sound recording.
However, the Bill also bears a construction favoring the
copyright owner. Section 114(b) goes on to state that, "this
right does not extend to the making or duplication of another
sound recording that is an independent fixation of other sounds
...." The word "other" implies that any use of the same sounds
would be an infringement. Since the economic effect of allowing
a taking of the broadcast in this situation is the same as per-
mitting duplication of the authorized sound recording, the latter
construction probably should prevail.
Yet, this interpretation brings additional problems. rt di-
rectly follows from such a position that when a performance is
recorded and the sound recording obtains protection under the
Bill, the owner of copyright enjoys the exclusive right to exploit
the particular sounds fixed in the sound recording. However, if
two persons were to record the same bird calls, probably neither
should have a right of action against the other, even if one of
them conceived the idea, found the location, and determined the
proper microphone placement. Similarly, if a performer author-
izes recording of a single performance by two persons, there can
be no infringement. Thus the proprietary interest in the sounds
contained in a sound recording must be limited to those cases
in which the owner of copyright either produces the sounds or
holds as assignee of the producer of the sounds.
D. DuRATioN OF COPYIGHrT
Copyright exists in a sound recording from the moment the
sounds are fixed in any tangible medium from which they can be
reproduced. 03 Where a work is prepared over a period of time,
the portion completely fixed at any given time constitutes the
work as of that time and is protected by copyright. 0 4  It is
a common practice in the recording industry to record several
renditions of a single tune during a recording session. Sections
of various tapes are often combined to produce the final pro-
103. Section 101 provides that "a work is 'created' when it is fixed
in a copy or phonorecord for the first time . . . ." Copyright subsists
in a work from the time of its creation. Bill § 302 (a).
104. Bill § 101 (Definition of "created").
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duct.105  Apparently the tape of each rendition would be sep-
arately protected from the moment of recording.10 6 Thus an
unauthorized reproduction of a discarded preliminary tape would
infringe copyright in that tape, not in the final sound recording.
The final composite tape would also be a separate version, and
copyright would subsist in it from the time it is recorded in its
final combined form.
As with all other copyrightable works, copyright in a sound
recording endures for the life of the author and fifty years after
his death.10 7 In the case of a work made for hire, the period of
protection is seventy-five years. 08  In both cases the period of
protection extends to the end of the calendar year of termina-
tion.109
E. NOTIcE
Notice must appear on the surface of the phonorecord, or on
the label or container, positioned in such a way as to give "rea-
sonable notice" of the claim of copyright." 0 Proper notice con-
sists of three elements: (1) the letter P in a circle; (2) the year
of first publication of the sound recording; (3) the name of the
owner of copyright, or an abbreviation by which the name
may be recognized."'
The P in a circle was selected to avoid confusion between
copyright in the sound recording and that in the printed matter
accompanying the phonorecord, and to avoid confusion between
the claim to copyright in the sound recording and the claim to
copyright in the underlying musical or literary work." 2 Gen-
erally the phonorecord need not bear a notice of copyright in
the underlying work." 3 However, in the case in which the sound
recording is used to obtain copyright of an underlying work, the
phonorecord probably should bear two notices.
105. Gould, The Prospects of Recording, High Fidelity, April 1966,
pp. 46, 53.
106. Section 101 (definition of "created") provides that "where the
work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes
a separate work."
107. Bill § 302(a).
108. Bill § 302(c).
109. Bill § 305.
110. Bill § 402(c). See also Bill § 402(b) (3); HousE REPORT 141;
PART 6, 102-03.
111. Bill § 402(b); HOUSE REPORT 141; PART 6, 105-09.
112. PART 6, 103.
113. HousE REPORT 141; PART 6, 100.
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Notice is only required on sound recordings published with
the authority of the copyright owner.114  Omission of notice
from an unauthorized publication, or one in which the author
has conditioned his authorization on use of the notice, does not
affect the author's rights.1 5 Since notice is required only on
phonorecords distributed to the public,"" the preliminary tapes
made during a recording session do not have to carry a notice to
be protected.
F. OwNEsHIP OF COPYRIGHT IN SoUND RECORDINGS
The Bill does not specify the owner of copyright in a sound
recording. The draftsmen felt that resolution of this problem was
best left to the employment relationship and to bargaining among
the parties concerned." 7 As the Bill is drafted, granting no per-
formance right in sound recordings, this result is probably satis-
factory. The manufacturer or producer, who would usually hold
the copyright as employer of the performers and technicians
contributing to the recording, is directly interested in the pre-
vention of dubbing and is in the best position to enforce the
rights granted by the Bill. If the copyright were, by designa-
tion of law, to be the property of those persons whose skills and
services produced the sound recording, or if the benefits of the
copyright were required to be shared among such persons and
the manufacturer or producer, many problems would be created.
The diversity of claimants would be great. Several individual
performers usually participate in a single recording. Sound tech-
nicians would certainly assert a claim that the creativity of their
efforts constitutes a part of that which is protected. Such diver-
sity would render enforcement of the right ineffective and make
an organized system of licensing difficult.
However, if the scope of the Bill were expanded to include a
performance right, contractual relationships might provide a less
desirable solution to the ownership problem. Since non-record-
ing musicians must compete for work with commercial uses of
recorded music, the American Federation of Musicians, which
represents both recording and non-recording musicians, might in-
sist upon retention of the performance right by the performers.
The manufacturers would probably prefer that the performance
right be waived, believing that wide use of the recording by radio
114. Bill § 402(a); PART 6, 100-01.
115. PART 6, 100.
116. Bill § 101.
117. HOUSE REPORT 47; PART 6, 5.
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broadcasters would increase record sales, and thus would be
reluctant to accede to this demand. Because of the power of the
American Federation of Musicians, which represents nearly all
performing musicians active in the recording industry, such a
conflict might not be easily resolved.
It may be argued that because such strife did not develop
from the grant of a performance right to motion pictures under
the present Copyright Act, the problem is insubstantial."8 The
analogy between sound recordings and motion pictures is quite
close. In both cases the producer combines the artistic and tech-
nical skills of a number of different individuals into an inte-
grated artistic work. The individuals involved are normally em-
ployees or contractors working under centralized control. Both
producers must edit the initial fixations and combine them to
produce the final product.
However, the right of performance in motion pictures was
established in the early days of the industry.1 9 Organization of
the contending groups grew up with the performing right. In
the recording industry the contending factions are already well
organized and relatively equal in bargaining power. The Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians has registered its opposition to the
present bill, insisting that the performance right should be recog-
nized and that the benefit of that right should inure directly to
the performers. 20 Thus each contending faction is certain to
assert vigorously its claim to any benefit bestowed by the Bill.
For these reasons, if the performance right is recognized, the
Bill should specifically designate the ownership of copyright in
sound recordings.
Administration of the right would operate most efficiently if
the record producer were the owner. The right would then rest
in a single entity, instead of in a shifting, highly mobile group of
118. Edison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. 240 (3d Cir. 1903), extended copy-
right to motion pictures. Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489
(2d Cir. 1937), indicated that this included a right of public perform-
ance.
It should be noted that numerous foreign countries (including Eng-
land) have extended a performance right to sound recordings. In each
case, the necessary economic give-and-taake occurred, and no cata-
strophic consequences ensued. Cf. PART 3, 358.
119. The earliest American motion picture case, Edison v. Lubin, 122
Fed. 240 (3d Cir. 1903), held that a motion picture of a ship launching
was properly the subject of copyright as a photograph. See also Annot.,
23 A.L.R.2d 244, 266-77, 349-51 (1952).




performers. Information about, and permission to use, a copy-
righted sound recording would be readily accessible. The term of
protection would be readily determinable.12 1 Further, the pro-
ducer is in a good position to protect the copyright.
It is true that the producer's interests may be antithetical to
those of the performers. Still, given the strength of the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians, it seems reasonable to assume that
the performers' interests will be protected. The English experi-
ence, where a strong musicians' union has been able to induce
manufacturers to restrict the grant of licenses to use recorded
music, is an indication of the validity of this assumption.
22
Finally, it is the producer who bears all the risks of the
venture. The performers are recompensed by salary at the time
of recording and by payments to a special fund for mechanical
royalties. Without someone to incur the risks of recording, a
performance remains an evanescent thing, incapable of copy-
right, and capable of only limited commercial exploitation.
In summary, the Bill should spell out that ownership of the
copyright in a sound recording is presumptively lodged, in the
first instance, in the producer of the sound recording.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The owners of copyright in sound recordings should be given
the exclusive right to perform the copyrighted works publicly.123
Of all works publicly performable, the Bill denies this right only
to sound recordings. 1 24 Because of the pronounced impact rec-
ognition of such a right would have upon the entertainment in-
dustry,1 25 the drafters of the Bill concluded that protection
against dubbing was the greatest gain presently feasible, and
intentionally omitted a performance right.
121. Regarding the producer as an employer for hire, the term
would be seventy-five years from the year of first publication, or one
hundred years from creation, whichever occurred first. Bill § 302 (c).
122. See REPORT OF THE CoPYRIGHT CoMMITTEE, CMD No. 8662, 51,
fI 144 (1952).
123. See Bill §§ 101 (definition of "publicly"), 106(4).
124. See Bill §§ 106, 114(a). The owner of copyright may, how-
ever, prevent unauthorized performances of the copyrighted work by
any user who reproduces the recording on another phonorecord. For
example, radio stations and background music services who use pre-
programmed tapes could not operate without authorization from the
owners of copyright in every sound recording used.
125. HousE REPORT 93-94; PART 6, 50, 51. There is genuine fear that




The conflict of interest among the several groups which
would be affected by the performing right is a substantial stum-
bling block now as it has been in the past.126 However, all inter-
ested groups recognize the urgent need for revision of the exist-
ing law, and it is unlikely that any group would destroy the Bill
over the issue of performing rights. Moreover, amendments to
copyright laws have historically been infrequent and slow to
respond to changing needs.17 Thus the performing right in
sound recordings should be recognized now.
Evaluation of the effects and desirability of a performing
right in sound recordings requires an examination of the con-
flicting economic interests involved in the recording industry.3s
The authors and composers, performers, and record producers are
the direct contributors to sound recordings. Since the effects of
a performing right would not be limited to the contributors to
sound recordings, the interests of users of recordings must also
be considered.
A. AUTHORS ANm CONIPOSERS 29
The role of the authors and composers 3" is most important
to the recording industry in the field of popular music. While
many pop recordings are made of previously recorded composi-
tions,8 1 the industry requires a steady input of new material to
126. Letter-memorandum from the executive secretary of the Shot-
well Committee, reprinted in 86 CONG. REc. 77, 78 (1940), and quoted
in STUnv No. 26 at 34.
127. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
128. Only two good studies are available, and both are extensively
relied upon here. These are CoRRY and GLOVER, HAWKINs, & CAMBRIDGE
RESEARCH INsTrruTIoN, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF T=E PROPOSAL To INCREASE
CoPYRIGHT LICENSE FEE FOR PHONOGRAPH RECORDS (1965) (reprinted in
1965 Hearings at 771-888 [hereinafter cited as GLOVER]. It should be
noted that GLOVER has not gone uncontradicted. See 1965 Hearings 286-
93 (statement of Mr. Julian Abeles of the Music Publishers Protective
Ass'n).
129. Publishers, as assignees of composers and authors, occupy a
position in the recording industry substantially identical to that of the
composers and authors. Thus, most comments contained in this section
are equally applicable to publishers.
130. The term "composer" is used here to refer to both the com-
poser of the music and the lyricist. Many compositions are written by
"teams" consisting of one or more musical composers and one or more
lyricists. Time, April 22, 1966, p. 44. In such cases the team divides
the composer's share of royalties. CORRY 31; 1965 Hearings 947.
131. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings 850-55, listing 207 separate recordings
of the song "I Believe" in the period Nov. 30, 1953-Jan. 7, 1965. See
also 1965 Hearings 920, showing the annual return to one publisher




The income of the pop composer 32 is primarily derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from commercial exploitation of three rights
guaranteed by both the present Copyright Act and the proposed
Bill. First is the sale of copies of his work in the form of sheet
music or other printed matter. Once the major source of income,
proceeds from the sale of sheet music are now relatively insig-
nificant.133
Of greater importance presently is the right to license a
copyrighted composition for recording. The Bill provides that
once the owner of copyright in a nondramatic musical work has
permitted phonorecords of his work to be distributed to the
public, he is required to license the composition, on terms and
conditions specified in the Bill, to any other person for the pur-
pose of making and distributing phonorecords.134 Mechanical
royalties collected pursuant to a similar compulsory license pro-
vision of the present act have been substantial. 35
The third source of income is the right to perform the copy-
righted composition publicly. Because commercial use of a pho-
norecord constitutes a public performance of the recorded com-
position, the performance right has increased in importance to
the composer with every expansion of the recording industry. 36
Individually, the composer is in a weak position to exploit
each of these rights. He does not have a strong bargaining posi-
tion with the publishing companies. It is difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a single composer to enforce his rights under the com-
dust") in that catalog which have generated income over a long period
of time.
132. Most of the sources of income to the composer of serious or
classical music do not depend upon the existence of copyright protec-
tion. For example, commissions, teaching, and conducting are the only
substantial sources of income to a great percentage of this class of com-
posers. 1965 Hearings 216-17, 260-61. For this reason most considera-
tions discussed here are of importance only to the composer of tunes
intended to gain wide public popularity.
133. Prior to 1950, it was not unusual for a composition to sell a
million copies of sheet music; now, 100,000 copies are considered a large
sale. 1965 Hearings 278. See also Finkelstein, The Composer and the
Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right Societies, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 275, 278-79 (1954).
134. Bill § 115.
135. Estimates of the total mechanical royalties collected in 1961
range from $9.75 million to $34.g million. CoRRY 31-32; 1965 Hearings
877.
136. In 1965 the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers collected nearly $43 million in performance royalties for its
members. Variety, March 2, 1966, p. 43, col. 4.
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pulsory license and performing right provisions. For example,
the composer of a recorded song could not separately negotiate
with every radio station which plays the recording over the air.
However, the rise of several professional organizations has
made the economic position of the composer secure. The Ameri-
can Guild of Authors and Composers, as the representative of
over 2,000 songwriters,1 3 7 has strengthened the bargaining posi-
tion of the composer before his publisher. Composers and pub-
lishers have banded together in two societies, the American Soci-
ety of Composers, Authors and Publishers, and Broadcast Music
Industries, which effectively enforce the compulsory license pro-
vision and the right of public performance.
The composers have advanced several arguments in opposi-
tion to the right of public performance in sound recordings.
Some have asserted that because the compulsory license provi-
sion fixes the mechanical royalty allowable to the composer, it is
unfair to grant an additional right to the performers and record
producers, who may freely exploit their products and services in
the open market. 38 However, the benefits flowing to the com-
posers from recordings are not limited to mechanical rights.
The composer collects performance royalties from commercial
users of recordings of his works. Neither the present act nor the
proposed Bill fixes a maximum performance royalty.
Unfairness also arises, it is asserted, from the fact that re-
cordings can be produced under a compulsory license without
the composer's permission. If a performing right were recog-
nized in a sound recording, the producer could limit use of the
recording, thereby unwarrantedly limiting the right of the
composer. 13 9 It is apparently felt that because the composer must
license his works for recording, the record producers should be
required to reciprocate by allowing free and unrestricted use of
recordings. While this is probably a legitimate concern, it should
not be seized upon as a reason for denying the performance
right to sound recordings. The problem can be adequately met
by creating another compulsory license providing that, once any
commercial use of a recording has been authorized, all commer-
cial users must be permitted to use it on the payment of a
specified fee.
137. CoRRy 25; 1965 Hearings 230. A similar organization, the
American Composers Alliance, performs a similar function for about
130 composers of serious music. 1965 Hearings 225.
138. See, e.g., PART 4, 456; STUmy No. 26, 49.
139. PART 3, 198, 202-03, 207-08; PART 2, 14.
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It is also argued that the grant of a performance right would
cause licensing problems and a multiplicity of claims against in-
nocent infringers.140 The licensing problem could be solved, as it
has been in the case of the performance right in musical com-
positions, by the formation of performing rights societies. Since
the Bill protects innocent infringers,1 4 only wilful violators of
copyright will be burdened by multiple claims.
The central objection of the composers to the performance
right in sound recordings seems to be based upon a fear that
the commercial users of recordings will pay no more to all per-
sons having rights in sound recordings than is presently paid as
performance royalties to the composers. Therefore the grant of a
performance right in sound recordings would decrease perform-
ance royalties passing to the composers. 42 However, the ex-
perience in countries which have recognized performance rights
in sound recordings does not support this argument. 43 It is
far more likely that commercial users would pay the additional
cost, either absorbing it or passing it on to the consuming public.
Thus, if properly drafted, a provision recognizing a perform-
ance right in sound recordings would not operate to the detri-
ment of composers.
B. PERFORMING ARTISTS
The performers are probably the most important factor in
the success of a sound recording, particularly in the popular
music field. 144 Musical compositions only have commercial value
when they are performed. Thus a large measure of the value of
a composition is directly attributable to the performers. While
the "name artist" is primarily responsible for record sales, all
performers contribute significantly to the overall result.
The rise of the phonograph record has had a great impact
upon performing musicians. The recording industry has not be-
come a substantial employer of musicians. While the American
Federation of Musicians claims 270,000 members, 45 only two or
140. PART 2, 12-14; PART 4, 456.
141. BMl § 504(c) (2) provides that, where the infringer establishes
that he was not aware and had no reason to be aware that he was
infringing copyright, the court may reduce the award of statutory
damages.
142. PART 4, 456.
143. Ulmer, The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 10 BuLL.
COPYMGHr Soc'Y 90, 98 (1962).
144. Comiy 82; 1965 Hearings 949-50.
145. 1965 Hearings 1390, 1410.
1967]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
three thousand musicians record with regularity.146 On the other
hand, commercial uses of records have sharply reduced employ-
ment opportunities for musicians. Radio has steadily decreased
its use of live musicians, replacing them with recorded music. 147
In recent years a new form of night club, the discotheque, has
developed which uses recordings to the exclusion of live music.148
The general availability of recorded music has tended to satiate
the public need for music, lessening -the popularity of activities
centering around live musical performances.
For these reasons, the American Federation of Musicians has
exerted great pressure in recent years to extend the benefits of
the profitability of the recording industry and to curb the effect
of recordings upon the demand for live performances. In addi-
tion to wages and other benefits to employee-musicians, record
companies employing union musicians pay royalties of one-half
cent per record sold to each of two union funds.149 The first of
these funds is distributed annually to musicians participating in
recording. The second, the Recording Industries Musical Per-
formance Trust Fund, is used to finance live performances of
music.
In furtherance of these same objectives, the AFM has fa-
vored the recognition of a performance right in sound recordings
and has insisted that the performance right 'run to the perform-
ers.1 0 The union argues that free and unrestricted use of phono-
records by radio broadcasters and jukeboxes is unfair to the
performers, since such commercial uses tend to displace live
performances.' 51 Since commercial uses make recordings better
known, and thus increase record sales, record manufacturers
would not enforce a performance right in sound recordings in
such a way as to substantially lessen commercial use of their
products. Thus the union's objective of creating more employ-
ment opportunities can be achieved only if the right of public
performance vests in the performers.
146. Letter from Mr. Samuel R. Rosenbaum, Trustee, Recording
Industries Music Performance Trust Funds, April 12, 1966, on file in
Minnesota Law Library. The AFM estimates that up to 4,000 musicians
participate in recordings. 1965 Hearings 1395.
147. 1965 Hearings 1394-95; Variety, April 6, 1966, p. 51, col. 1.
148. See, e.g., Variety, April 6, 1966, p. 56, col. 4; Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 14, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
149. Phonograph Record Trust Agreement, Jan. 1964, pp. 17-18.
150. 1965 Hearings 1417-19. The AFM proposal essentially splits
copyright in the sound recording, with the record manufacturer retain-
ing the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute phonorecords of it
and the performers having the exclusive right of public performance.
151. Sr'mY No. 26, 29-30; 1965 Hearings 1393, 1404 n.16.
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The concern about the decrease in employment of perform-
ing musicians is legitimate,152 and should be shared by per-
formers, employers of musicians, and the public generally. The
decline in employment opportunities not only operates as a hard-
ship to musicians but also makes the music profession less attrac-
tive. Consequently, musically talented young persons may refrain
from choosing a career in music, causing a general decline in the
quality of music performance.
Nevertheless, the right of public performance in sound re-
cordings should not be given directly to the performers. The
right of public performance should be recognized and should be
exploited to the benefit of the performers. Yet the interest of
the performers in the suppression of commercial uses of record-
ings is too strong, particularly if the American Federation of
Musicians holds the right as assignee or representative of the
performers, for them to have sole control of the performance
right. While substantial suppression of commercial uses prob-
ably would increase employment opportunities, it would greatly
prejudice the interests of composers, publishers, commercial users
of recordings, and the public. The performers should not be
given such a powerful weapon to further their purposes.
Thus the drafters of a performance right provision should
not grant the right to the performers alone. Such a provision
should explicitly vest ownership of the performance right in the
record manufacturer to preclude the performers from bargaining
for ownership.
C. REcoRD PRODUCEmS
The phrase "record producer" is used here to denote the cor-
porate or private individual who employs and directs the various
talents necessary to the production of a sound recording. Ap-
proximately three thousand enterprises presently produce rec-
ords. s3 They range in size from one man operations, which pro-
duce master recordings and subcontract the preparation of phono-
records, to major corporations occupying a substantial share of
the market.154
The income of record producers is derived solely from the
sale of records.155 Recent studies indicate that while record sales
152. 1965 Hearings 1404-05.
153. CoRR" 46-49; 1965 Hearings 940.
154. Id.
155. See 1965 Hearings 947 (statement of Alan W. Livingston, Pres-
ident, Capitol Records, Inc.).
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have risen, profit margins have declined due to increased pro-
duction costs.156 Although a new company can begin producing
recordings with little capital, it has become difficult for a small
operation, without a large and diversified catalog, to compete
successfully.15 7 One study indicates that, notwithstanding the
relatively large number of competitors, three major producers
lead in almost all types of recordings. 15
Some manufacturers have urged recognition of a performing
right in sound recordings. 59 Probably the most persuasive ar-
gument favoring this position is that the existence of such a right
in all other publicly performable works makes denial of the right
in sound recordings unfair. 60 For example, the performance
right is recognized in movies under both the present act and the
proposed Bill. Like a movie, a sound recording is a composite
work, embodying the creative contributions of many persons.
No distinction is apparent which can serve as a rational basis for
treating them differently.
It may be argued that since commercial uses publicize record-
ings and increase record sales, record manufacturers have no
need for the protection that would be afforded by the perform-
ance right. However, although the producers would probably
find it in their best interest to waive the performance right in
many instances, this is not an adequate reason for refusing the
right. The producer of the sound recording should be permitted
to choose which uses are to be allowed. Overexposure of a
recording by radio broadcasters can have the effect of satiating
public interest rather than stimulating record sales. Further-
more, because the commercial user profits from his use of a re-
cording, the notion of fairness which underlies all copyright leg-
islation would seem to demand that profits be shared with the
creator of the recording.
The grant of a performance right to record producers would
inure to the benefit of all contributors to recordings except the
composers and authors. The performers, sound technicians, and
other employees of producers are all represented by strong unions
or individually enjoy a strong bargaining position with the pro-
156. 1965 Hearings 805; Hamill, The Record Business--"It's Murder,"
Fortune, May 1961, pp. 148-49.
157. See Hentoff, The Major Minors, Saturday Rev., Sept. 28, 1957,
p. 67.
158. Comy 251.
159. PART 3, 352-59; 1965 Hearings 946-63.
160. PART 3, 352-59; STUDy No. 26, 30.
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ducer. Therefore they would succeed in sharing the increased
profitability which the performance right would bring to the in-
dustry and probably would be able to force the producers to re-
frain from allowing commercial uses which are highly prejudi-
cial to their professions.
D. COMMERCIL USERS oF SouND RECORDNGS
1. Broadcasters
Radio broadcasters are the primary commercial users of
sound recordings. As much as eighty percent of all broadcast
time is devoted to recorded music.16 1 While the continued suc-
cess of the radio industry probably depends upon the availability
of recordings, radio plays a vital role in the development and
exploitation of sound recordings. 162 The popularity of any one
recording is due in large part to the amount of exposure it re-
ceives from broadcasters. 163 The payola scandal of recent years
is evidence of the influence of radio upon record successes.164
Radio broadcasters, through the National Association of
Broadcasters, traditionally have opposed the grant of a perform-
ance right in sound recordings, contending that recognition of
the right would unduly prejudice smaller stations operating at
minimum profit margins. 6 5 It is probably unavoidable that an
innovation of the breadth of a performance right would necessi-
tate a certain amount of economic adjustment. However, such an
adjustment has been effected satisfactorily in those countries
which have recognized a performance right in sound record-
ings.166
Because of the great interdependence between the broad-
casting and recording industries, it is unlikely that record pro-
ducers would exercise the performance right in a manner impos-
ing a substantial burden on even marginal broadcasters. For
example, probably the greatest number of financially insecure
radio stations are those concentrating on programming, such as
classical music, which is not carried by most broadcasters. Pro-
ducers of classical recordings utilized by such broadcasters would
161. ComRY 99; 1965 Hearings 1394, 1404 n.1.
162. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMiwcm ,
86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SONGPLUGGING AND THE AIRWAVES: A FUNcTIONAL
OUTLINE OF THE PoPuLAR Music BusINss 8 (Comm. Print 1960).
163. See Grevatt, The Artist as Businessman, High Fidelity, June
1963, pp. 32, 97 (by implication).
164. See CORRY 97-98.
165. See, e.g., STUDY No. 26, 33-34 (by implication).
166. PART 3, 358; STUDY No. 26, 38-44; Ulmer, supra note 143, at 98.
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certainly be willing to license their recordings at rates which
would not endanger their principal means of broadcast expos-
ure.167 Further, public demand for such specialty programming
has developed to the point where any increase in costs caused
by a performance right probably could be absorbed. 1 8 Thus,
unless the performance right is vested in a group, such as the
performers, whose interest is adverse to that of the broadcasters,
recognition of the right will not substantially impair the pros-
perity of the radio industry.
The broadcasters have also argued that a performance right
in sound recordings should be denied because of the great role of
radio in establishing the popularity of recordings.169 This is not
an adequate reason for refusing recognition of the right. What-
ever service is performed for record producers by radio broad-
casting can best be accounted for in the bargaining for license
privileges between the broadcasters and producers. Not all
broadcasting of recordings is beneficial to the financial success
of a recording. Certainly the indebtedness of the producer to
radio broadcasters is not so great that the producer should be
denied all profit from commercial uses of his product.
2. Jukeboxes
Since jukebox operators are also a major commercial user of
recorded music,'1 0 a performance right in sound recordings would
also affect them. Jukeboxes, like radio broadcasting, are de-
pendent upon the availability of sound recordings, but are also a
significant medium for the popularization of new recordings.
Like the radio broadcasters, jukebox operators would un-
doubtedly oppose recognition of a performance right in sound
recordings, based upon a fear that such a right would jeopardize
167. ASCAP presently charges stations specializing in classical music
lower license fees than those generally prevailing in recognition of the
low profitability of such enterprises. Interview with Midwestern radio
station manager. Memorandum on file with Minnesota Law Review.
Presumably the owners of copyright in sound recordings would adopt a
similar practice.
168. Attempts by certain broadcasters to drop unprofitable pro-
gramming have met with strong adverse public reaction, forcing those
broadcasters to find additional financial support for the specialized pro-
gramming. Variety, March 23, 1966, p. 37, col. 1.
169. See, e.g., STUDY No. 26, 36.
170. In 1961 fourteen percent of all unit sales at retail of recordings
were made to jukebox operators. As many as 50,000 jukeboxes may




the profitability of their businesses and drive many marginal
competitors out of the industry. Intensifying this fear is a pro-
vision of the Bill which peculiarly affects the jukebox industry.
Under the present law, jukeboxes are operated under an exemp-
tion from the performance right of authors and composers 17-
The proposed Bill would eliminate that exemption and substitute
a compulsory license provision under which jukebox operators
would pay a small license fee to the owner of copyright of the
recorded compositions. 17 2 Thus if a performance right in sound
recordings were added to the Bill, jukebox operators would be
required to absorb two new performance royalties.
However, it is unlikely that recognition of the performance
right would seriously affect the financial position of the opera-
tors. Since the interest of record producers generally favors
stability in the jukebox industry, performance right fees prob-
ably would not be set at rates which could not be comfortably
absorbed.
E. THE PuBLIC
Public benefit from a performance right in sound recordings
could develop from several sources. The public interest favors'
the development of new creative talent and art forms. Repre-
sentatives of the industry point to the present relatively poor
profit margin prevailing in that industry.1 73 A right to remu-
neration for commercial use of recordings could certainly im-
prove that situation. To the degree that record companies enjoy
a more solid economic position, they might be encouraged to
sponsor experimental projects having a lesser potential for im-
mediate economic gain.
The record manufacturers have also contended that a per-
formance right would permit them to place less emphasis on the
teenage and sub-teen market.'7 4  The supposition underlying
this argument is that, while broadcasts of music appealing to the
teenage market tend to stimulate record sales, other types of
music are directed toward persons whose musical needs are
largely satisfied by radio broadcasts and who do not buy records..
Therefore, recordings of music of the latter kind would be dis-
171. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1964) provides that a performance on a coin-
operated phonograph is not a public performance for profit unless ad-
mission is charged to enter the establishment having the phonograph.
172. Bill § 116; see HoUSE RFPORT 112-13.
173. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings 895.
174. 1965 Hearings 951.
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proportionately benefited by the performance right, enabling rec-
ord producers to devote a greater portion of their efforts to such
recordings.
A performance fee for commercial uses of sound recordings
would almost certainly increase the costs of music to the con-
suming public. In many cases the costs would be passed on in-
directly, as where a radio station increases its time charges to
advertisers, who in turn raise consumer prices to meet the in-
creased advertising costs. Since the public is the ultimate con-
sumer of the recording, it seems proper that the public bear the
costs. Experience in other countries indicates that the industry
can and will make the economic adjustments required to accom-
modate the new interests granted.
A performance right in sound recordings would probably
make the industry a more healthy one, and would encourage
more people to make a career in the performing arts. It would,
therefore, "promote the progress of science and the useful arts,"
and would be in the public interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of the protection to be accorded sound record-
ings has plagued the courts and the copyright bar for a number
of years. In the hodgepodge of common law theories, no one has
been sure what rights exist in recordings. In clarifying the
status of sound recordings and elevating them to the plane of
other intellectual products, the Bill makes a significant advance
over the present law. Its major deficiency is that it does not
extend protection for sound recordings to the full scope of copy-
right accorded other works. Specifically, the following changes
in the Bill appear warranted:
(1) Sound recordings should be accorded a right of public
performance, limited to the right to receive remuneration for
commercial use of the recording.
(2) The Bill should state explicitly that the producer of a
sound recording is the author, as an employer for hire.
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